By Yoo Jung
July 6, 2026 · 9 min readOn 24 June 2026 in Monterrey, Mexico, South Korea entered its final Group A match against South Africa with a clear route toward the expanded World Cup’s round of 32 and, on paper, the stronger chance to survive.
South Korea had opened the tournament with a 2-1 comeback win over the Czech Republic, then lost narrowly to co-host Mexico, which left the South Korean team needing a win, or even a draw, against South Africa to secure a knockout tie against Canada in Los Angeles.
World Football Elo Ratings placed South Korea 40th and South Africa 73rd on 6 July 2026. Opta’s supercomputer gave South Korea a 56.2 percent chance of victory, a draw a 23.5 percent chance, and South Africa only a 20.3 percent chance of producing an upset.
Yet South Africa won 1-0, pushed Korea into third place in the group, and forced the team to wait for other results before elimination became official on 27 June, when DR Congo beat Uzbekistan 3-1 in Group K and other third-placed teams finished with stronger records or goal differences.
The match itself unfolded with the weight of a missed opportunity. South Korea allowed 29.6 passes per defensive action, its highest figure in any World Cup game since at least 2018, suggesting a passive defensive approach in a match that demanded control.
After the 1-0 defeat, a Korean Broadcasting System reporter asked Hong an unusually direct question: “The players just looked heavy. Were they collectively food-poisoned prior to the game? Or was there anything that happened that was out of your control?”
Hong rejected that explanation and answered plainly: “The performance itself was not good… Out of three matches in the World Cup, we played the worst game today. That is true.” His answer acknowledged the scale of the failure while giving no external excuse.
The most controversial tactical decision came before kickoff. Hong left captain Son Heung-min, South Korea’s record appearance maker and most globally recognized player, on the bench. Goalkeeper Kim Seung-gyu said the squad learned of the decision during the pre-match meeting.
Hong later explained that he hoped Son, then 33, could enter when South Africa became a “bit weaker” and exploit gaps in the back line. That plan brought Son on at half-time, but he struggled to turn the match around.
Son avoided public criticism of the manager in the mixed zone and said, “I feel sorry I couldn’t help the team.”
The emotional force of the defeat grew because South Korea carried more talent than the result suggested. The squad included Son, Paris Saint-Germain’s Lee Kang-in, and Bayern Munich defender Kim Min-jae, alongside other players in major European leagues.
Before the second group match, Lee Kang-in had even ranked first overall in the World Cup passing grades released by Gradient Sports, scoring 86.0 and recording a 100 percent passing success rate with three key passes against the Czech Republic. Lee Kang-in’s passing under pressure score of 86.5 and one-touch passing score of 85.9 also ranked first overall, while Lee Ki-hyuk and Seol Young-woo entered the top 40.
These figures sharpened the criticism after the South Africa match. Korea had individual quality and a favorable group, yet produced what one journalist described as making the players “look like cowards.”
The team finished Group A with three points, with one win against the Czech Republic and losses to Mexico and South Africa. Because the group contained no traditional heavyweight and Korea had been viewed as the second-strongest team behind Mexico, many supporters saw the exit as avoidable.
Hong had told FIFA before the tournament that he wanted Korea to become “one of the top teams rather than a side just capable of producing the occasional upset.”
Hong resigned on 28 June 2026 at South Korea’s training base in Zapopan, Mexico.
He told reporters, “I would like to offer my sincere apologies to the people of Korea who love soccer and supported the national team. I am resigning from my post as head coach of the national team.”
He added, “We did not deliver the results the fans expected, and the responsibility falls entirely on me.” In a separate press conference, he said, “It was not an easy decision for me to take this role, but once I took it, I thought about nothing else except being responsible until the very last moment.”
His prepared statement framed resignation as an act of accountability. He left without taking questions.
Hong’s resignation revived one that had followed him since July 2024. The Korea Football Association appointed him on 8 July 2024, five months after Jurgen Klinsmann’s dismissal following South Korea’s Asian Cup semi-final defeat to Jordan.
Hong’s playing legacy included captaining Korea to fourth place at the 2002 World Cup, winning the Bronze Ball, and earning 136 caps. His coaching record also included the 2012 London Olympics and K League titles with Ulsan Hyundai in 2022 and 2023.
Yet his first World Cup as manager in 2014 ended with a winless group stage and included a 4-2 loss to Algeria that many fans remembered with anger.
The process became the center of the institutional dispute. Park Joo-ho, a former player and member of the KFA committee that recommended coaches, alleged that the process broke down before Hong’s appointment.
“Nothing was done as part of the process,” Park said in a YouTube video, claiming that candidates lacked a fair selection system.
The KFA rejected the claim, insisted that Hong’s appointment followed due process, and warned Park that it was considering legal action.
Park Ji-sung, former Manchester United midfielder, said: “I think people have lost trust in the KFA, and it will take a long time for the association to regain that trust.”
A government audit in late 2024 gave the legitimacy crisis official force. The audit concluded that both Klinsmann’s removal and Hong’s appointment lacked transparency. It found that “the KFA’s Technical Director, who was not authorized to do so, interviewed Hong at the president’s instruction without a fair or transparent process.”
It also stated that Hong had “effectively been chosen before the appointment was presented to the board,” turning the board’s later written approval into “little more than a formality.”
Parliament summoned KFA president Chung Mong-gyu twice in 2024, and lawmaker Bae Hyun-jin questioned rumors of “a cartel based on alumni ties to a specific university” inside the KFA. The government recommended disciplinary action against three KFA executives, including Chung, while the KFA challenged the decision and secured a suspension of enforcement.
President Lee Jae Myung posted a long statement on X on 28 June, four days after the match, and said, “I am not just taken aback by this unexpected outcome — I am utterly baffled.”
President Lee linked the result to public accountability, writing, “Given that significant national taxpayer funds and state support resources are invested even in World Cup participation, I ask that the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism thoroughly investigate the precise circumstances of this incident, analyze its causes, and develop thorough measures for preventing recurrence and improvement.”
He wrote, “We will swiftly push forward with reforms to sports administration to ensure such a thing never happens again.” Lee added, “When favoritism and cronyism take precedence over competence in selecting a commander, the result is as clear as day,” and said the result “appears to be the result of organizational and personnel failures.”
On 30 June, Culture, Sports and Tourism Minister Chae Hwi-young announced a “special audit of the KFA” that would examine “the root causes of the devastating failure” and turn its findings into “a painful lesson so that such incidents never occur again.”
Critics of the KFA argued that the South Africa result exposed long-term administrative failure rather than a single bad night. Sports critic Choi Dong-ho said, “At the heart of the problem is KFA’s incompetence.”
He contrasted Korea with Japan, saying the Japanese national team had found “a clear answer to the fundamental question of what the team should strive for,” while South Korea “starts from scratch every four years.” He pointed to more than 10 coaches since 2002 and argued that the KFA had failed to build “a clear footballing identity rooted in a long-term philosophy.”
Opposition to the backlash also emerged, especially from Japan. On 1 July, Taro Kono, a Japanese House of Representatives member and former Shonan Bellmare chairman, wrote on X, “Don’t bully our OB Hong Myung-bo.” The term “OB,” derived from “old boy,” refers in Japan to a former member of an organization or sports club; Hong played for Bellmare Hiratsuka in 1997 and 1998.
Columnist Ichiro Enokido also defended him, writing, “Myung-bo, I hope you come to Japan,” and adding, “J.League fans have not forgotten your fighting spirit.”
Japanese commentators and social media users framed the Korean criticism as excessive. One user wrote, “When the team wins, Son Heung-min gets the credit; when it loses, the coach takes the blame.”
Another asked, “Who would want to manage the national team if the president criticizes you whenever you lose?”
Inside Korea, the anger reached supporters’ groups and the airport. On 29 June, the Red Devils- official supporters’ club for the South Korea national football team- declared that they would “fight by mobilizing every means until the deep-rooted evils that eat away at Korea’s soccer disappear.”
Their statement said, “Only for the players, all the people once again cheered with all sincerity,” then added, “We offered that sincerity and in the end became fools.” They insisted that anger came from more than failing to play “one round-of-32 match” and said fans wanted a team that could play “without regret.”
When the national team returned to Incheon airport at close to 4 a.m. on 1 July, about 160 police officers stood by as fans booed, whistled, and shouted: “Hong out!” Some fans followed Hong toward his car, while others cheered the players behind him. The scene replaced the earlier welcome in Mexico, where mariachi music and sombreros had greeted the squad in Guadalajara.
South Korean football built its modern emotional identity in 2002, when the national team reached the World Cup semi-finals on home soil and filled streets with public celebration.
Since then, the country has produced elite players, global stars, and moments such as the 2018 win over Germany and the 2022 last-16 run after beating Portugal. Yet the 2026 exit pushed South Korea down to 32nd in FIFA’s rankings, its lowest position in four years.
A balanced conclusion must separate three issues. First, South Africa earned its win, and Korea’s performance drew tactical criticism based on both the result and the data. Second, Hong accepted responsibility, yet his defenders fairly warn that blame can become excessive when it targets a person rather than a system. Third, the KFA faces a deeper transparency problem because audits, player testimony, parliamentary questions, and fan anger all point to distrust in the way power operates.
Son wrote after elimination, “This tournament was more precious to me than anything else,” and said seeing “the stage where a child’s dreams come true” collapse left him with “an indescribable sense of heaviness and heartache.”
